the defendant if honestly, even though unreasonably, made. I' The tax law's failure to distinguish between mistakes of law and fact represents a significant departure from traditional criminal law.
"Ignorantia legis neminem excusat," or "ignorance of the law excuses no man" ranks among the most familiar maxims of law.' 2 This rule usually applies regardless of the severity of the crime, and even if the entire community holds the mistaken belief. 13 Commission of a crime requires both a criminal act and a criminal intent, although the defendant need not specifically intend to break the law.' 4 Simply intending to commit the criminal act satisfies the intent requirement in all but a small class of offenses in which the mental element is part of the crime itself. 15 There are numerous reasons why the law has not historically allowed ignorance to excuse a criminal act. Protecting the public safety and welfare requires the presumption that each person knows the law.' 6 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes made the following observation:
Public policy sacrifices the individual to the general good. It is desirable that the burden of all should be equal, but it is still more desirable to put an end to robbery and murder. It is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the criminal could not have known that he was breaking the law, but to admit the excuse at all would be to encourage ignorance where the law-maker has determined to make men know and obey, and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the scales.
17
By establishing the rule that each citizen "must know what the law is and act at his peril,"' 8 the law encourages knowledge in an arena where ignorance is extremely harmful. Without this policy, said one court, "a person accused of crime could shield himself behind the defense that he was ignorant of the law which he violated [and] immunity from punishment would in most cases result.... The plea would be universally made, and would lead to interminable questions incapable of solution."' 9
B. SPECIFIC INTENT CRIMES
Some crimes require specific intent, or knowledge of violation of the law, as an essential element. In specific intent crimes, ignorance or mistake can serve as a defense if it negates the required mental state. 2 0 Certain statutes, including the Internal Revenue Code, expressly criminalize only "willful," "knowing," or "purposeful" conduct. 2 1 Such statutes, however, have received different treatment from the courts depending on the nature of the regulated activity.
For example, in United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp. ,22 the Supreme Court held that a shipper could "knowingly" violate a regulation without knowledge of the regulation's existence. 23 The defendant, International Minerals, was charged with shipping sulfuric and hydrofluosilicic acid interstate without proper shipping papers, in violation of Interstate Commerce Commission regulations. 2 4 International Minerals made no mistake of fact; it knew the shipment contained corrosive materials. 2 5 Rather, International Minerals contended that it was unaware of the regulation, and the question before the Court was, therefore, whether to allow the mistake of law as a defense. 2 6 A divided Court did not permit ignorance of the regulation to be a defense to its violation. 2 7 Because of the involvement of dangerous materials, "the probability of regulation [is] so great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of... or dealing with [the materials] must be presumed to be aware of the regulation." 28 The majority reached the holding over the dissent of Justices Stewart, Harlan, and Brennan, who argued that a defendant cannot "knowingly" violate a regulation if the defendant is not aware of the terms of the regulation or that the activity violates the regulation. 2 9 According to the dissent, the majority 20 Section 2.04(1) of the Model Penal Code states:
Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if: (a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense; or (b) the law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense. Model Penal Code § 2.04(l) (1985) . 29 Id. at 567 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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opinion ignored the statute's use of the word "knowingly.
' 3 0
C. "WILLFULNESS" IN TAX LAW
The Internal Revenue Code uses the word "willful" liberally. 3 ' Before the Court addressed the issue in Cheek v. United States, several circuit courts formulated their own interpretations of the willfulness component of tax crime.
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits applied a subjective test, which asked whether a tax crime defendant truly believed his actions complied with the law. In United States v. Phillips, 3 2 a taxpayer defended himself on the grounds that he truly believed his wages were not income. 3 3 The trial court had instructed the jury as follows:
A mistake of law must be objectively reasonable to be a defense. If you find that the defendant did not have a reasonable ground for his belief, then regardless of the defendant's sincerity of belief, you may find that he did not have a good faith misunderstanding of the requirements of the law. The trial court convicted the defendant under this instruction, but the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial. 3 5 The court reasoned that by requiring a "willful" violation, Congress did not intend to impose criminal liability on those who rely on their good faith belief that they need not file a tax return. 3 6 For this reason, the Tenth Circuit stated, courts should use a subjective standard when evaluating a defendant's claim that he did not know he was breaking the law.
3 7 Thus, prosecutors must prove that tax eva- sion defendants subjectively intended to disobey the law. The subjective intent standard of Phillips paralleled decisions in several other circuits. 38 The circuits following the subjective standard have carefully distinguished between those taxpayers who misunderstand the law and those who understand but disagree with it.
39
A taxpayer who is unaware of the law may assert ignorance as a defense, but a taxpayer who merely disagrees with the law may not. 40 Before the Supreme Court decided Cheek, the Seventh Circuit took a different approach 4 ' by permitting only honest and reasonable mistakes as a defense to a tax evasion charge. 4 2 The Seventh Circuit applied an objective test to the taxpayer's mistaken "belief." 43 If a reasonable person would realize the groundlessness of the belief, the court may impose criminal sanctions. 44 A defendant's honest but unreasonable belief that he owed no taxes was held to be no defense to tax evasion. 4 5 If a court found the defendant's belief unreasonable as a matter of law, the sincerity of the belief became irrelevant. 4 6 In such a case, the court was not obligated to accept evidence demonstrating that the defendant actually held the mistaken belief. 47 Under the Seventh Circuit's pre-Cheek approach, courts determined the reasonableness of a belief on a case by case basis. 48 In United States v. Buckner, 49 however, the court accepted the prosecutor's list of five defenses which would always be considered unreasonable, or, in Judge Easterbrook's words, "sanction bait." 50 The 54 It vigorously defended its standard, even in the face of criticism from other circuits, 55 in part out of its desire to deprive tax protestors of their favorite weapons. The subjective standard followed in other circuits deferred to the "true beliefs" of the defendant, an approach the Seventh Circuit simply refused to accept. As Judge Easterbrook wryly noted, "some people believe with great fervor preposterous things that just happen to coincide with their self-interest." The tax protest movement frustrated the increasingly impatient Seventh Circuit with creative but absurd defenses. In United States v. Witvoet, 5 7 for example, the defendant argued that he did not pay taxes because "tax experts" advised him that payment of income tax was "purely voluntary" and in some cases, illegal. 58 One of these experts called himself a C.P.A., a designation not for "certified public accountant," but for "citizen's protection agent."- 59 The district judge instructed the jury that "willfulness" meant a "voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal duty, a burden that could not be proved by showing mistake, ignorance, or negligence." 74 The court also instructed the jury that a reasonable, good faith mistake of law would negate willfulness, but mere disagreement with the law would not. 75 When the jury requested clarification of the good faith requirement, the judge instructed that "an honest but unreasonable belief is not a defense and does not negate willfulness. ' 7 6 Under this standard, the jury found Cheek guilty.
77
Cheek appealed, arguing that the district court erred by giving the jury an objective reasonableness instruction. 78 The Seventh Circuit, following its own precedent, upheld the instruction. 7 9 Because the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of "willfully" in the tax code conflicted with the interpretation of other-circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 80 The Supreme Court began by noting the traditional principle that ignorance of the law provides no defense and the corresponding presumption that every person knows the law because the law is "definite and knowable." ' The Court said, however, that the growing volume and complexity of statutes and regulations, including the Internal Revenue Code, raised questions about the soundness of this premise. 8 2 Consequently, the Court long ago determined that Congress used the word "willfully" in the tax code to carve an exception to the traditional principle. 8 3 The Court recalled its sixty year old statement from United States v. Murdock:
Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a re- Since Murdock, the Court had defined "willfully," in the context of the tax code, as a "voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty."
8 5
Cheek argued that by allowing the jury to consider the objective reasonableness of his beliefs, the district court's instruction was inconsistent with the Murdock interpretation."
The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the jury should have determined whether the prosecution had proved Cheek's awareness of his duty to file a return and pay taxes.
8 7 The objective reasonableness of his claimed belief or misunderstanding was completely irrelevant to this question. 8 8 No matter how unreasonable ajury might find Cheek's belief that the Internal Revenue Code did not treat wages as income, if they found that Cheek truly held such a belief, they must acquit him.
The Court rejected Cheek's claim that he believed income tax laws violated the Constitution. 90 This belief, said the Court, was not an innocently mistaken belief about the content of the law, but a studied conclusion that the law was invalid.
9 ' In other words, Cheek did not make a mistake about the law; he simply disagreed with it. 92 Over the dissent ofJustices Blackmun and Marshall, who feared that the majority opinion would "encourage taxpayers to cling to frivolous views ... in the hope of convincing a jury of their sincerity," 93 the Court vacated and remanded the case. 94 The Seventh Circuit, the majority held, erred by allowing objective reasonableness to enter the calculation. 9 5 Thus, Cheek demands a purely subjective inquiry into the taxpayer's mental state to determine whether the defendant willfully violated the tax code. 
II. "WILLFULNESS" AFTER Cheek
Commentators have given Cheek mixed reviews. One commentator hails the decision for striking "a sensible balance between disciplined regard for the dictates of precedent and awareness of practical policy ramifications." '9 7 The Seventh Circuit approach, he argues, would have "benefitted judicial economy at the expense of logic and consistency." 98 Another commentator, however, contends that the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of "willfulness" emasculates the Internal Revenue Code by making it virtually impossible to convict tax evaders. 99 Cheek has raised new questions as the circuits struggle to determine the scope of Cheek's definition of "willfulness." Circuit courts have construed Cheek narrowly in some cases but broadly in others. 100
A. APPLICATION OF CHEEK TO TAX CASES IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
The Second Circuit gives Cheek its broadest reading. 1 0 1 In United States v. Regan,' 0 2 the Second Circuit relied on Cheek to reverse a district court decision. 1 0 3 In Regan, an investment firm entered into several stock sale and repurchase agreements with other investment houses in order to recognize tax losses on stock which had depreciated in value. 10 4 The defendants improperly recognized tax losses, they claimed, because they mistakenly believed that their transactions fell outside the scope of Internal Revenue Code Section 1058, which provides for nonrecognition of gains or losses under certain circumstances. 10 5 The defense produced witnesses who testified that the firm's interpretation of section 1058 was reasonable, but the district court ruled as a matter of law that the firm's interpretation was incorrect. 1 0 6 Citing Cheek, the Second Circuit re- The Second Circuit, however, upheld the instruction in its entirety, reasoning that the trial court's instruction adequately warned the jury that the Fletchers were guilty only if they knew their actions violated the law. Other circuits have applied the Cheek rule differently. The Fifth Circuit, like the Second Circuit, permits a jury to consider the basis for the defendant's good faith belief. The Fifth Circuit reasons that the Supreme Court's Cheek decision "clearly anticipated and condoned the jury's consideration of the bases upon which the defendant claims to have held his subjective belief. ' 124 This rationale recognizes the practical difficulty in distinguishing between subjective and objective beliefs.
The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, may actually prohibit the defendant from introducing evidence demonstrating the basis of his subjective beliefs. In United States v. Fingado, 12 5 the defendant testified that he sincerely believed he was not required to file tax returns. 126 He based his belief on materials he received at a seminar, a newspaper article, and a book entitled The Big Bluff, Tax Tyranny in the Guise of the Law, The Constitution v. The Tax Collector.
12 7 The district court, however, did not allow the jury to review the contents of the book 128 and the circuit court affirmed, a result which one commentator called "distinctly unfair.
' 129
According As a practical matter, the court must give the jury something on which to base its determination other than the defendant's testimony that he truly believed he complied with the law. Under Cheek, however, the court must carefully instruct the jury to ultimately inquire into what the defendant actually believed. 136 If the court permits the jury to consider evidence which does not directly relate to the taxpayer's state of mind, the jury may inappropriately answer the wrong question. For example, in a case in which the court admits into evidence the defendant's background as an accountant, the jury should consider that information only to the extent it bears on that particular defendant's beliefs. This inquiry comes perilously close to the improper question of whether it is reasonable for an accountant to be unaware of the tax rule in question.
A proper instruction also makes it clear that a taxpayer may assert a good faith misunderstanding, but not a good faith disagreement with the law, as a defense. 137 The Supreme Court once said that "'willful' is a word of many meanings, its construction often being influenced by its context." 1 3 9
Judge Learned Hand has called it "one of the most troublesome words in a statute." 1 40 The word so bedeviled the drafters of the Model Penal Code that they purposely excluded it. 141 In spite of this judicial trepidation, the term "willfully" appears throughout the criminal law, raising the question of whether the Supreme Court's definition of "willfulness" in Cheek has any application outside of tax cases. Although non-tax cases frequently cite Cheek, generally only those charged with tax crimes have enjoyed the full protection of Cheek's ignorance defense.
In United States v. Dockray, 14 2 the government charged the defendant with mail and wire fraud, an offense requiring proof of intent to defraud. 1 43 In defense, Dockray claimed that he acted in good faith.
14 4 He asked the judge to specifically instruct the jury that if they found that he truly, even if mistakenly, believed he was acting properly, they should find him not guilty. 14 5 The district court explained the requirement of intent to defraud to the jury, but did not use the words "good faith." 1 46 The First Circuit affirmed, recognizing the good faith defense in mail fraud cases but holding that the words "good faith" were not magical and not required in the jury instruction. 14 7 The court said Cheek did not control because the issue in the instant case was whether the existence of the good faith defense had been adequately conveyed to the jury, a point which Cheek did not address.' 48 One commentator asserts that in Dockray, the First Circuit took a "half step" in its "aggressive effort to limit the rule of Cheek" to tax evasion cases.1 4 9 The court completed this step in United States v. 
Donovan.' 50
In Donovan, the government charged a bank president with willfully failing to file currency transaction reports, which the law requires whenever a bank accepts any cash deposit exceeding $10,000.15' The defendant argued that Cheek established a purely subjective test for every white collar crime which includes willfulness as an element of the offense. 15 2 Consequently, he asked for a Cheek jury instruction which would require the jury to exonerate him if they found that he honestly did not know that his failure to report the transaction violated the currency transaction report filing requirement, regardless of the reasonableness of his belief. 153 Rejecting the defendant's argument, the court explicitly stated that Cheek applies only to tax crimes.' 54 Calling Donovan's interpretation of Cheek "distorted," the First Circuit noted that "nowhere in Cheek, or in the Court's earlier opinions involving criminal prosecutions under the tax laws, is there any indication that a purely subjective standard should be used in evaluating state-of-mind defenses in prosecutions under other federal statutes."' 55 In Cheek, the Court "crafted a narrow exception, limited to tax cases, in which subjective mistake of law can constitute an absolute defense."' 156 The Donovan court believed that Cheek's rationale-that tax laws were complicated and difficult to understand-did not apply to the bank's filing requirements. 157 Thus, as subsequent non-tax decisions make clear, Cheek created a specific, narrow exception to the traditional common law principle that ignorance is no defense. Ignorance of the law is still no defense-unless the crime is tax evasion.
III. THE NEED FOR AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD
From a stare decisis perspective, the Supreme Court correctly decided Cheek. Supreme Court cases have long supported the notion that, in the tax law, "willfulness" means knowledge that one's activity violates the law. 158 The Seventh Circuit, believing that the Supreme Court cases of Murdock, 159 Bishop, 160 and Pomponio' 6 not preclude an objective reasonableness instruction,' 6 2 was clearly an aberration among the circuit courts, the rest of which applied a purely subjective standard. In Cheek, the Supreme Court clarified its position on the impropriety of an objective reasonableness instruction.1 63 At the very least, the Cheek decision was consistent with previous Supreme Court interpretations of "willfulness." Although the Supreme Court has clearly defined willfulness, this definition is not necessarily optimal in terms of benefits to society and fairness to individual taxpayers.' 64 So far, this Comment has attempted only to chronicle the development and application of the "willfulness" doctrine in federal tax law, before and after the Supreme Court's decision in Cheek. In this section, however, this Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit's pre-Cheek approach is superior to the present state of the law. Before a defendant should be permitted to claim mistake or ignorance as a defense, the law should require her to demonstrate that her mistaken belief or lack of knowledge was objectively reasonable. An unreasonable belief, even if sincerely held, should not serve as a defense to tax evasion.
Under this proposal, a taxpayer's mistaken belief would excuse the taxpayer from criminal liability only if the belief is both objectively reasonable and sincerely held. Similar to a negligence standard, the law would presume the taxpayer to have at least a minimal knowledge of the tax law. This standard would not require taxpayer expertise or even familiarity with all aspects of tax law. It simply presumes that all Americans are aware that taxes exist and insists they take basic steps to learn the fundamentals, such as reading the IRS tax form instructions.
Using an objective reasonableness standard would bring tax law into alignment with other areas of criminal law. Also, an objective standard is fair to the defendant, it better prevents flagrant abuse of the tax system, and it would improve tax compliance. Congressional action, in the form of either replacing or redefining the word "willfully" in the Internal Revenue Code, could effectively realize the advantages that an objective approach would generate without upsetting a long line of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
A. THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD PROVIDES CONSISTENCY
Our fundamental sense of fair play insists that we treat similar situations similarly. The law, in its pursuit of justice, places a great premium on consistency. One of the oldest and best known principles of the American legal system is that ignorance of the law cannot serve as a defense for a criminal act. 165 As drafted by Congress and interpreted by courts, the Internal Revenue Code contains an unnecessary and ill-advised exception to this principle for tax crimes.
In Cheek, the Supreme Court failed to provide a logical basis on which to distinguish tax evasion from other types of crime, where citizens are presumed to know the law and act at their peril. Even if the courts could provide a distinction between common law crimes such as murder and more modern regulatory crimes, they have failed to provide a justification for applying one standard of willfulness to tax cases and a different standard of willfulness to other white collar crime cases.
The Supreme Court argues that the great complexity of the tax code justifies the tax crime exception. 166 However, complex laws govern other white collar crimes, and in these cases, the law does not excuse ignorance. Cheek gives special treatment to "ignorant" tax evaders. 16 7 Donovan makes clear that Cheek's subjective test applies only to tax crimes. 168 Other white collar crime defendants can "willfully" violate a law even if they truly, subjectively believe they are faithfully complying with it.169 Thus, "willfully" means one thing to a tax defendant and something else to a defendant accused of a different white collar crime.
The courts should not excuse taxpayer ignorance because of the complexity of the tax code. Other white collar crime statutes can be equally complex. 170 In Donovan, a bank president claimed to misunderstand the currency transaction recording requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a); 17 1 in Cheek, an airline pilot claimed to misunderstand the law which says income is taxable. 172 While some provisions of the Internal Revenue Code are extremely complicated, the basic concepts of taxation that apply to most taxpayers are not. As one commentator writes, "[i]f anything, the laws relating to money laundering, securities, and other 'white-collar' areas are more esoteric and more difficult to comprehend than the comparatively straightforward requirements concerning the reporting of wages as Tax statutes and white collar crime statutes arguably differ in one important respect: the types of people attempting to comply with them. Individuals who must comply with securities laws or bank recording regulations, for instance, usually possess some technical expertise as a result of their vocation. Individuals who must comply with tax laws often have no business background. This argument, however, does not justify the use of different standards. Courts should hold an individual responsible for knowing the laws governing that individual's sphere of activity. The bank president bears the responsibility of operating a bank and complying with applicable laws, and the ordinary citizen bears the responsibility of paying taxes and following the Form 1040 instructions.
The criminal law currently applies the subjective standard only in tax cases, even though the special treatment of tax defendants has no logical foundation. The disparate treatment of tax crime defendants and other white collar crime defendants is unfair because it is based on transparent distinctions. Using an objective standard in both instances would make the law more consistent, and therefore more just.
B. THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD PROVIDES FAIRNESS
John Cheek's Seventh Circuit brief analogizes his indoctrination into a tax protest group to the foibles of a naive fraud victim who is taken in by a smooth-talking "con man." 174 Cheek compares the tax protestors who persuaded him that their beliefs were true to "snakeoil salesmen of lore" and argues that he "bought their desert real estate and their wellness potions."' 175 Unlike the sucker who buys snake-oil, however, John Cheek and the others directly benefitted from being "taken in." Because he benefitted, the law need not sympathize with him as though he were a victim. Cheek and other tax protestors more closely resemble a person who buys a new color television set from the back of a truck in an alley for twenty dollars. Despite suspicions about the legitimacy of the sale and the television's origin, the purchaser keeps the television and remains silent.
Critics of the pre-Cheek Seventh Circuit objective standard contend that it unfairly punished taxpayers who made innocent, honest mistakes. Even though the objective standard only punishes unrea- 
89-658).
175 Id. sonable mistakes, critics fear that the courts will jail "honest and sincere persons whose legal sophistication fails to reach some judicially-created standard."' 17 6 The judicially created standard of reasonableness, however, can be set at a level which ensures that those who make an effort to reach it will succeed. The fishnet can be dropped low enough to capture only the bottom-dwellers.
An objective standard would impose a duty on taxpayers to know the fundamental concepts of the tax law. It would not require the taxpayer to understand all the nuances of the tax code. The law would simply presume that all citizens know that a tax system exists which requires taxpayers to pay income taxes, just as it presumes that everyone who drives a car knows the traffic laws. For example, a taxpayer's honestly held but mistaken belief that she may deduct all of her capital losses would qualify as reasonable;1 7 7 John Cheek's honestly held but mistaken belief that wages are not income would not.
The presumption that citizens are aware of tax filing requirements does not unduly burden taxpayers. If death and taxes are the only two sure things in life, it seems only natural to presume that adults are aware of each.
In his brief, Cheek criticized the Seventh Circuit for using a standard under which taxpayers with questions or confusion about their tax obligations act at their peril. 178 Forcing taxpayers to act at their peril is, if anything, an advantage of the Seventh Circuit objective approach. When faced with an objective standard, a taxpayer who is uncertain about his obligations under the law will either carefully read his instructions, seek advice from a professional or obtain free assistance from the IRS. If the same confused taxpayer is not forced to act "at his peril," instead of taking steps to inform himself, he may simply assume that the correct answer to his tax question is the one which most reduces his tax liability.
Congress should give the taxpayer the benefit of the doubt, defining reasonableness broadly so as to allow all but the most outrageous mistakes as a defense. In practice, almost nobody would fall into the crack between the objective and subjective standards. There is the discomforting possibility, however, that under the objective standard a taxpayer who truly wanted to do the right thing could make an honest mistake which is deemed unreasonable-and by implication, criminal-by a jury. 176 Id. 177 Capital losses may be deducted only to the extent of capital gains, plus the lesser of $3000 or the excess of losses over gains. I.R.C. § 1211 (b) (1988) .
178 Brief for Petitioner, Cheek (No. 89-658).
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There are two safeguards, however, which would prevent this unfortunate result. The first is IRS discretion in deciding which taxpayers to prosecute. The objective standard gives the IRS a powerful weapon because the standard makes it easier to convict tax evaders. Because the IRS operates with limited resources of time and money, however, it probably will not try to use this weapon in marginal cases, where the taxpayer's mistake looks honest even if it does not look reasonable.
The second safeguard is that in practice, the same outcome will usually result regardless of the chosen standard. Even when the court instructs the jury to use the subjective standard and to determine what the defendant actually believed, the jury often uses an objective standard anyway. Under Cheek, juries may consider the reasonableness of the belief, but only as it pertains to the ultimate issue of the defendant's subjective belief.' 79 As the Court put it, "the more unreasonable the asserted beliefs or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will consider them to be nothing more than simple disagreement with known legal duties."' 8 0 When the jury tries to look into the defendant's mind, the reasonableness of the claimed beliefs will inevitably enter the calculation.
At worst, the objective standard would create uncertainty. "Reasonableness" is impossible to define clearly and could vary, depending on the particular case and jury. As one court said, however, " [u] ncertainty is a fact of legal life. 'The law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree.' "181
In Cheek, the Supreme Court quoted an earlier case which said, "it is not the purpose of the law to penalize frank differences of opinion or innocent errors made despite the exercise of reasonable care. ' 182 This statement implies that when reasonable care is not exercised, the law may penalize even innocent errors. An objective standard does precisely that, without unfairly burdening taxpayers.
C.
THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD PREVENTS ABUSE OF THE SYSTEM This analysis has, until this point, assumed that the defendant taxpayer truly holds an unreasonable belief about his income tax obligations. One of the most compelling reasons to move away from the subjective standard of Cheek, however, is to enable effective prosecution of those who do not "truly" hold their mistaken beliefs-those who either consciously cheat on their taxes or intentionally avoid learning the applicable rules and then feign ignorance when caught. Most taxpayers do not realize that the "ignorance of the law is no excuse" maxim does not apply to tax law. 18 3 As a result, the ignorance defense is most often invoked by sly taxpayers who are well aware of the heavy burden the government bears in tax crime prosecution.
184
The objective standard would add another hurdle for manipulative taxpayers to clear before the law exonerates them. The Seventh Circuit used the objective approach, in large part, for this reason. The Cheek decision, in overruling the Seventh Circuit, invites abuse.
Allowing ignorance as a defense without regard to reasonableness creates undesirable incentives. The law encourages taxpayer ignorance, because the prosecution can use a taxpayer's knowledge against him.
18 5 In Cheek, the Court noted that the jury could consider evidence showing that Cheek was aware of his tax obligations. 18 6 This would include evidence that the taxpayer knew of the relevant Internal Revenue Code provisions, court decisions rejecting the taxpayer's interpretations, IRS rulings, and the contents of the personal income tax return forms and instructions. 8 7 Under this rule, a taxpayer wishing to pay as few taxes as possible should ignore all mail from the IRS. The IRS could later use the fact that the defendant read the 1040 instructions as evidence of the taxpayer's subjective awareness of the law.' 8 8 As a result, a taxpayer who reads the instructions and still makes a mistake will have difficulty demonstrating ignorance.' 8 9 A taxpayer who is truly confused about the rules would be better off taking a wild guess, filing a return, and later pleading ignorance if the guess proves inaccurate. Under the subjective standard, having knowledge of the tax law can only work against a defendant. Consequently, this standard creates an enormous disincentive for a taxpayer to learn about tax obligations.
The objective standard, on the other hand, provides an incentive for the taxpayer to learn. To escape criminal liability, the taxpayer need not hold completely accurate beliefs, but she must hold 183 Yochum, supra note 12, at 227. reasonable beliefs. A taxpayer who generally familiarizes herself with the tax rules, understands her obligation to file a return, and makes an honest attempt to comply should have little difficulty meeting this standard. As the Seventh Circuit summarized this principle, "[i]f the legal system either refuses to recognize a mistake of law as a defense (the usual rule) or accepts only a reasonable mistake as a defense (our rule in tax cases), this leads people to learn and comply with the law."
The subjective standard also encourages defendants to lie to the jury. Since the case focuses on the defendant's state of mind at the time of the alleged transgression, the defendant's personal testimony becomes extremely important. Although the subjective standard permits the jury to consider objective factors, 19 1 the jury must ultimately determine what the taxpayer actually believed. Because corroborating evidence on this question is understandably hard to produce, the jury might not demand any, and instead place great weight on the defendant's explanation. A skillful liar thus has a better chance of acquittal in a tax case than in non-tax criminal cases, where the prosecution has greater opportunity to present evidence contradicting the defendant's testimony.
The nature of tax crime especially tempts a defendant to lie, not only because it is in the offender's best interest and is likely to work, but because, in the offender's mind, it is easy to justify from a moral standpoint. Tax evaders often rationalize non-compliance on the grounds that the government wastes tax dollars anyway, that loopholes unfairly allow others to avoid taxes, or that failure to comply does not really hurt anyone.' 9 2 Ordinarily law-abiding citizens, whose personal moral codes would prevent them from committing other crimes or lying about it afterwards, might intentionally violate tax laws and then lie to a jury without even flinching.
The objective standard allows the jury to evaluate a defendant's testimony against a backdrop of reasonableness. As the Seventh Circuit explains, "the reasonableness requirement is intended to give the jury a method by which they can distinguish between a bona fide misunderstanding of the law and obdurate refusal to acknowledge... what the law indeed does require."' 193 Thus, the defendant needs more than a convincing lie to avoid punishment. In addition to convincing a jury that his mistaken belief was truly held, a taxpayer using this defense must convince the jury that the belief was reasonable.
In addition to encouraging ignorance of the law and deception, the subjective standard encourages people to lie to themselves.
4
If a taxpayer can convince herself that her view of the tax law, no matter how mistaken, is correct, she technically has not committed a crime. In many cases, this self-persuasion will not prove too difficult a task. Most taxpayers are probably all too eager to believe whatever interpretation will reduce their taxes the most. As the Seventh Circuit summarized, "[l]imiting the [ignorance] defense in tax cases is essential because the desire to keep as much of one's income as possible would supply an irresistible temptation to be obtuse about the law, if obtuseness eliminated the duty to pay." ' 195 Critics of the objective standard have argued that the Seventh Circuit fashioned its doctrine solely out of frustration with the tax protest movement. 19 6 While this charge may have merit, it does not follow that the Seventh Circuit standard is improper. On the contrary, destruction of the tax protest movement is an advantage of the objective standard. The fact that the development of the doctrine might have been driven by the Seventh Circuit's desire to discourage "tax protest"' 9 7 makes it no less desirable in other circumstances.
By some estimates, there are over 13,000 tax protestors in the United States. 1 9 8 They call themselves "great American heroes," 19 9 and they conduct seminars to teach their followers, among other things, that the Sixteenth Amendment is unconstitutional. 20 0 They instruct followers to claim hundreds of dependents on their W-4s, thereby preventing income from being withheld 20 1 and to file frivo-lous tax returns. 2 02 They encourage followers to obtain a jury trial so that sympathetic jury members will acquit after the jurors themselves are indoctrinated into the tax protest movement 203 during the course of the trial. 204 True "tax protestors" are not really ignorant of the law; they simply disagree with it. Because disagreement with the law is not a defense under Cheek, 20 5 the tax protestor should in theory be found guilty under either the objective or subjective standard. In practice, however, tax protestors are much more difficult to convict under the subjective standard. Since the reasonableness of the "mistake" is irrelevant under the subjective standard, a defendant tax protestor can escape conviction by successfully feigning ignorance.
Tax protestors hold various beliefs about taxation, few of which are objectively reasonable. One defendant, for instance, said he failed to pay taxes because he believed that IRS agents were "Satan's little helpers." 20 6 Whatever their belief, tax protestors do not pay taxes and jam court dockets with frivolous litigation. Tax protestors drain judicial resources which could be better spent elsewhere. Tax dollars are lost at both ends: revenues lost because protestors do not pay taxes, and revenues spent bringing them to justice.
7
Tax protestors thrive under a subjective standard. They wither, however, under a standard which requires their beliefs to be reasonable. 2 0s An objective standard gives the IRS an effective tool in its pursuit of those tax evaders who routinely shirk their tax responsibilities. If the law defines reasonableness broadly enough, truly innocent taxpayers will not be convicted.
The case of John L. Cheek illustrates the need for an objective standard. A sophisticated commercial airline pilot claims to believe that his wages are not income and that he has over fifty depen-dents. 20 9 Were these beliefs objectively reasonable? Certainly not. Were they truly held? Given the fact that for most of his adult life, Cheek had properly filed his tax returns, it is hard to believe that he was genuinely unaware of his obligations. A more plausible explanation is that John Cheek was nothing more than a tax protestor who disagreed with the tax laws. At least two district court jurors, however, were convinced that he sincerely held his unreasonable beliefs. 2 10 Under a subjective standard, Cheek would have probably been acquitted at the trial level.
As Justice Blackmun suggests in the Cheek dissent, there are certain things that every person of minimum intellectual competence knows. 2 1 1 The dispute in Cheek did not involve complex tax law, but "the income tax law in its most elementary and basic aspect: Is a wage earner a taxpayer and are wages income?" 2 12 If Cheek could escape criminal sanctions, it is difficult to conceive of a defendant who would not.
D.
THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD WOULD IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE
The "tax gap" statistic refers to the difference between the revenues actually collected by the IRS and the revenues which the IRS would collect if every citizen filed an accurate tax return. 2 13 According to IRS estimates, the gap in the United States is over $80 billion annually. 2 1 4 Using an objective standard would help to bridge this '"gap.")
The Internal Revenue Code views criminal sanctions as merely the "capstone" 21 5 of an elaborate enforcement system which utilizes a variety of civil remedies, including fines and penalties. 2 1 6 The IRS may apply these penalties to taxpayers who do not comply with the law, even if the taxpayer did not act "willfully" as defined by the Supreme Court. In a "voluntary" 2 17 compliance system like the one 217 "Voluntary" does not mean optional, but rather that the tax system depends on taxpayer honesty. Professor Mark Yochum defines the term "voluntary" in the following manner:
["Voluntary" is] a fictive locution meaning a gun is not pointed at the payor by the collector. Compliance is achieved through simplicity in calculations and payment, through honesty and altruism of our citizens, and through the uneasy feeling, pur-in the United States, the law must give taxpayers strong incentives to comply. Empirical evidence suggests that criminal punishment serves as a powerful deterrent to tax evasion. 218 Given the infrequency of IRS audits and the correspondingly high probability that a tax evader will escape detection, the law should make the consequences for those who are caught especially dire. Civil penalties have questionable deterrent effect, since they merely involve a financial transaction between the transgressor and the IRS. A potential tax evader may perceive his choice as either dutifully paying now or paying only when and if he gets caught. Although financial penalties are levied on top of the amount the tax evader would have paid had he complied, 2 19 tax evasion becomes a rational gamble. Facing the possibility of imprisonment and the stigma of a criminal label, however, the risk calculus changes.
Because revenue collection in a voluntary system depends so heavily on taxpayer cooperation, the law should not allow ignorance as a defense. 220 An objective standard encourages taxpayers to learn and follow the law. If a taxpayer knows the IRS is watching and will press criminal charges unless he acts reasonably, he will be all the more inclined to look up the rule in question. Under a purely subjective standard, where ignorance is bliss, that same taxpayer may simply assume that the rule works in his favor. After all, what he does not know cannot hurt him.
One commentator has suggested that the Internal Revenue Code incorporate a standard of "recklessness." ' 2 2 ' Under this approach, a taxpayer could be prosecuted even if he did not behave willfully. 2 22 This standard, however, encounters many of the same pitfalls as the subjective standard. A "recklessness" standard still accepts ignorance of the law as a defense unless the taxpayer was posefully engendered by the tax collector, that his baleful eye watches us all always, his strong arm ready to nab a transgressor for a penalty or worse. 219 Chapter 68 of the Internal Revenue Code provides the rules for the assessment of penalties. The penalties vary depending on the type of violation and whether the taxpayer is an individual or a corporation, but for non-fraud violations the penalties are relatively small. For example, the penalty for an individual failing to file cannot exceed 25% of the tax owed. I.R.C. § 6651 (a)(1) (1988). The penalty for negligence or disregarding rules or regulations is 5%o of the underpayment. I.R.C. § 6653(a) (1988 reckless. 223 Therefore, it still provides inappropriate incentives for a taxpayer to avoid knowledge of the law, so long as the taxpayer's avoidance of knowledge never crosses the line into "recklessness." Moreover, it would continue to unduly hamper the prosecution of tax protestors. John Cheek's beliefs, for example, were unreasonable, but was he reckless? The "recklessness" standard offers an unnecessary and potentially confusing compromise. The recklessness standard attempts to accommodate the honest, but unreasonable, taxpayer who would be guilty under an objective standard. A taxpayer, however, should have an affirmative duty to obtain a reasonable understanding of his income tax obligations. A truly "honest" taxpayer will do more than just refrain from recklessness. A truly honest taxpayer will take her income tax responsibilities seriously enough to read the Form 1040 instructions and conscientiously follow them each year.
IV. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Cheek, the Supreme Court made it clear that the traditional maxim "ignorance of the law is no defense" does not apply to tax crimes. 2 24 A taxpayer may behave outrageously, even to the point of not paying any taxes, without criminal penalty, as long as the taxpayer subjectively believes he is obeying the law.
25
The message to would be tax evaders is clear: If you don't know anything about taxes, you can't be guilty of tax crime. Don't learn, because knowledge can only be used against you. If an armed robbery defendant cried "I forgot armed robbery was illegal," ' 2 26 society would scornfully convict him. Failing to convict in such a case would allow that individual's beliefs to trump the law itself.
2 27 Yet the tax defendant who pleads, "I didn't know that my wages were income" escapes punishment. 2 28 His belief becomes reality. Under the current, subjective standard of willfulness, it is not a crime to avoid paying taxes as long as the taxpayer does not believe it is a crime. The tax law to which most Americans attempt to faithfully adhere is robbed of its power. A standard of objective reasonableness, when used in careful conjunction with the standard of subjective belief, can untwist this perversity. Congress should redefine the 
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willfulness standard to include taxpayers who avoid filing returns or file inaccurately in reliance upon objectively unreasonable mistakes. While some areas of the tax law are complicated, the fundamental concept is really quite simple: Those who earn income must pay taxes. The IRS, in fact, tries to simplify the tax laws and even provides free assistance to those who request it.229 The tax law is not complex enough to justify a departure from one of the oldest and most sensible principles of common law. Ignorance should not be rewarded; it should be punished. Ignorance should not be bliss; it should be perilous.
MARK C. WININGS
229 Yochum, supra note 12, at 223.
